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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of in-house counsel1 is one of the most significant shifts in 
the legal profession over the past half century.2  Traditionally, in-house counsel were 
stereotyped as inferior legal service providers.  They were unfairly viewed as lawyers 
“who had not quite made the grade as partner” at their corporation’s principal 
outside law firm. 3   Today, a broader conception of in-house legal departments 
prevails, and the corporate legal department function has transformed the delivery of 
legal services.4  A growing number of corporations, facing increasing costs due to 
business and legal complexities, are deciding to “make versus buy” a greater 
proportion of their legal needs in lieu of procuring legal services from the wide array 
of outside law firms available in the marketplace.5  Just as greater divisionalization in 
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1 This article uses the term “in-house counsel” as interchangeable with general counsel, corporate 
counsel, and corporate legal departments. 
2See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV.
277, 293-94 (1985); Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057-59 (1997). 
3 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 277. 
4 See Daly, supra note 2, at 1062-63. 
5 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112-123 (1971) (describing vertical integration and the make-versus-buy decisions made 
by firms).  In fact, “[i]n-house legal departments were the fastest-growing ‘legal services sector’ around 
the world over the last five years.  In some markets, the growth reflects a compound increase of 15% 
per year.”  Richard Stock, The Future for In-House Counsel, LEGAL TECH. INSIDER, June 2008, at 1; see
also JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 223 
(2006) (“As of 2002, there were some 65,000 in-house counsel in the United States.”); George P. 
Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1654 (2006) (“Corporate legal departments have exhibited significant growth since 
the early 1980s and have continued this trend in recent years.  Between 1998 and 2004, the 200 largest 
in-house legal departments grew from a total of 24,000 to 27,500 lawyers.  Armed with more talent 
and the goal of cutting costs, corporate law departments are performing an increasing share of legal 
work in-house.”); Daly, supra note 2, at 1059 (“Between 1970 and 1980, there was a 40-percent 
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the modern corporation can be explained, to a large extent, via transaction cost 
economizing, the growth of in-house legal departments can be viewed through a 
similar lens.6  Moreover, “[i]mprovements in [the] reputation and skill of in-house 
lawyers . . . mark a watershed in legal demographics.”7  Despite these important 
developments, there is a relative dearth of scholarship dedicated to this important 
transformation, as well as its impact on corporate governance.8
II. REASONS FOR UNDER-EXAMINATION
The key reasons for the omission of in-house counsel in the corporate 
governance literature are not unfamiliar and resemble several general blind spots, 
namely: (i) the difficulty addressing corporate complexity; (ii) the preoccupation with 
director-shareholder dualism; and (iii) the overemphasis on symbolic procedures 
reflecting democratic values like independence.9
increase in the number of lawyers working in-house; and between 1980 and 1991, there was a 33-
percent increase.”). 
6 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1537, 1537 (1981) (“While I recognize that there have been numerous contributing 
factors, I submit that the modern corporation is mainly to be understood as the product of a series of 
organizational innovations that have had the purpose and effect of economizing on transaction 
costs.”); see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962). 
7 Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 498 
(2008); see also Baker & Parkin, supra note 5, at 1637 (noting the significant “rise of corporate in-house 
counsels”). 
8 See Daly, supra note 2, at 1067 (“Unfortunately, scholarly writers and researchers have paid very little 
attention to the combined effect of the growth in number, prestige, and power of in-house counsel 
and the globalization of the business and capital markets. . . . This is a subject matter that cries out for 
greater empirical research and scholarly analysis.”); see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 298-99 
(“[C]orporate counsel’s office may not be as professionally independent (although most general 
counsel would dispute it).  This impression may account for the failure of corporate counsel to attract 
many students from prestige law schools.  Thus far, these students remain the preserve of the firms.”); 
Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 957 (2005) 
(“[G]eneral counsel’s position has a paradoxical quality:  While a lawyer who serves as general counsel 
of a large corporation holds the clearly defined power associated with a hierarchical position in a large 
bureaucratic organization, the position itself is ambiguous in many ways that may prove troubling.”). 
9 See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation 
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 341-42 (2009) (explaining that procedural requirements that mandate 
independence in the context of corporate governance may not achieve their objectives and fail to 
address certain issues); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing that corporate law must acknowledge technical and normative 
complexity to retain its legitimacy); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 6-10 (2005) 
(highlighting three enduring issues that stifle regulators: risk taking, competition, and the increasing 
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A. Complexity
First, the difficulty with developing a concise theory of in-house counsel 
stems from the complexity of the role.10  In-house counsel are the “Swiss army 
knife” of the legal profession.11  Existing theories, standing alone, fail to capture this 
complexity; they are too abstract and detached to account for institutional detail.  
Sometimes “[r]eality is too complicated and admits of too many interactions to be 
modeled.”12  On the other hand, the value of theory is not limited to its ability to 
make accurate predictions or simply reflect reality, but its ability to enhance the 
understanding of real world phenomena.13  A presumption of immeasurability that 
often attaches to complexity may be so strong that no attempt is made to make 
observations about the so-called immeasurable value of in-house counsel.14  A more 
pragmatic approach to examining in-house counsel is to consider whether theory can 
improve upon the existing knowledge of in-house counsel value creation and in-
house counsel impact on corporate governance. 
B. Director-Shareholder Dualism 
The second reason for the omission of in-house counsel from the corporate 
governance literature is a preoccupation with director-shareholder dualism that 
overlooks the impact of a range of internal actors, such as in-house counsel, on 
complexity of organizations).  This list of blind-spots is illustrative and not intended as an exhaustive 
list.
10 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional 
Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 5 (2006) (“A major factor contributing to 
the variety and complexity of the tensions faced by the general counsel is the multiplicity of roles 
counsel is expected to play.”). 
11 See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and 
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1003-20 (2007) (noting the various roles of general 
counsel, which include legal advisor, educator on legal compliance, transactions facilitator, company 
advocate in litigation and with governmental authorities, investigator into potential legal issues within 
the organization, compliance officer, corporate ethics officer, manager of law department and of 
outside legal resources, management committee member, strategic planner, legal services marketer, ad 
hoc planning advisor, ethics counselor, crisis manger, and arbitrator). 
12 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 
251 (1984). 
13 See id. at 252 (“The value of the model, however, rests not on how well it describes reality, but on 
whether it allows us better to understand it.”).  But see Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive 
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 4 (1953) (asserting that the value of theory hinges on 
its ability to make accurate predictions). 
14 See DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, HOW TO MEASURE ANYTHING: FINDING THE VALUE OF 
INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS xi-xiv (2007). 
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corporate governance.  A corporation is much more than directors and shareholders; 
it is a complex bureaucracy composed of multiple layers of management, where 
decision-making occurs at all levels of the firm on an intertemporal basis.  The legal 
literature often vacillates between shareholder and director primacy, with occasional 
detours.15  Even the more recent focus on gatekeepers is limited because observers 
often reflect a bias for outside actors versus internal agents of the corporation.16
Although the gatekeeper hypothesis rightly assumes the inevitability of outsourcing 
certain compliance responsibilities to independent third parties, this does not obviate 
the need for complementary internal legal capabilities. 
C. Symbolic Procedural Mechanisms 
The third and arguably most important reason for the omission of in-house 
counsel from the corporate governance literature is the overemphasis on symbolic 
procedural mechanisms reflecting independence in order to achieve effective 
governance and compliance with the law.17  When assessing the quality of corporate 
15 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 8-12 (2008) (discussing shareholder primacy, director primacy, managerialism and 
stakeholder theoretical approaches); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 287-92 (1999) (acknowledging that directors, within their 
discretion, may consider non-shareholder interests in order to maximize the joint welfare of all firm 
stakeholders); see generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric 
on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675 (2006) (describing the impact of stakeholder rhetoric); Marleen 
O’Connor-Felman, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure (Employees and Corporate 
Governance), 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POLICY J. 97 (2000). 
16 See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 5, at 7 (“The board of directors in the United States is today composed 
of directors who are essentially part-time performers with other demanding responsibilities.  So 
structured, the board is blind, except to the extent that the corporation’s managers or its independent 
gatekeepers advise it of impending problems.  In the absence of independent professionals – auditors, 
attorneys[,] and analysts – boards will predictably receive a stream of selectively edited information 
from corporate managers that presents the incumbent management in the most favorable light 
possible.”); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 62 (1986) (emphasizing third-party gatekeepers); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside 
Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 415 (2008) (“[G]atekeeping scholars have traditionally conceived 
the gatekeeper as an outside professional services firm which has a contractual relationship with the 
primary enforcement target (the client).”). 
17 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 799 (2001) (“Current policymaking 
initiatives show an increasing tendency to assume the benefits of director independence and 
accountability, and hence the self-evident desirability of legal reforms to promote them.”); see also 
Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance,
54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921-22 (1999) (examining the effectiveness of greater board independence); 
Simmons, supra note 9, at 359-60 (describing how corporate constituencies use symbolic procedures 
as a heuristic to discern reform quality); Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 
447, 447 (2008) (“[I]ndependent directors are useful only in situations where a conflict exists.  An 
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reform or reformers, corporate constituents often look to mechanisms promoting 
independence as a proxy for value.  This symbolic attachment or so-called 
“fetishization” of independence has, in part, blinded observers to the impact of in-
house counsel.18  The most prevalent critique of in-house counsel in the corporate 
governance literature contends that in-house counsel’s lack of independence or 
capture makes them less effective gatekeepers than outside lawyers and other 
reputational intermediaries in promoting healthy corporate governance. 19   The 
independence or capture critique, even if correct, is often accepted by observers 
without a robust inquiry or empirical validation.  It is a causation fallacy to assume 
that, due to the employee status of in-house counsel, they are ineffective as 
gatekeepers or that outside counsel are more likely to act with virtue.  Even if outside 
counsel were more willing to monitor, “inside counsel have an overwhelming 
advantage in their ability to monitor.”20  Moreover, economic pressures that may 
constrain in-house counsel also remain an issue for outside law firms.21  The broader 
question is not necessarily the need for independence, but for virtuous agents to 
remain “faithful” to their profession and the client corporation.22  Independence is 
independent director – a part-timer whose contact with the corporation is necessarily limited – is not 
inherently better suited to further the interests of shareholders than an inside director.  Current rules 
thus over-rely on independence, transforming an essentially negative quality – lack of ties to the 
corporation – into an end in itself, and thereby fetishizing independence.”). 
18 See generally Rodrigues, supra note 17 (describing the overreliance on the use of “independent” actors 
for corporate governance). 
19 Jack Coffee’s insightful book examining the critical role of gatekeepers on corporate governance
embraces this critique: 
While the outside attorney has been increasingly relegated to a specialist’s role and 
is seldom sought for statesman-like advice, the in-house general counsel seems 
even less suited to play a gatekeeping role.  First, the in-house counsel is less an 
independent professional–indeed he is far more exposed to pressure and reprisals 
than even the outside audit partner.  Second, the in-house counsel is seldom a 
reputational intermediary (as law and accounting firms that serve multiple clients 
are) because the in-house counsel cannot easily develop reputational capital that is 
personal and independent from the corporate client. 
Coffee, supra note 5, at 195. 
20 Kim, supra note 16, at 417. 
21 See Duggin, supra note 11, at 1035 (“The report of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 
specifically notes that ‘[t]he competition to acquire and keep client business, [like] the desire to 
advance within the corporate executive structure, may induce lawyers to seek to please the corporate 
officials with whom they deal rather than to focus on the long-term interest of their client, the 
corporation.’”) (quoting American Bar Association, Recommendations of the American Bar Association Task 
Force on Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/corpgov.pdf).
22 See Rodrigues, supra note 17, at 451. 
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usually not an issue until a conflict or potential bias arises.23  Most of the value-
creating functions and daily duties performed by in-house counsel do not raise 
conflicts.  Thus, a myopic focus on independence ignores a significant amount of 
value created by in-house counsel that, on balance, may outweigh the risks and 
probabilities associated with potential conflicts and insider bias.24  While singing the 
virtues of independence, one cannot ignore the tangible and intangible value created 
by in-house counsel.25
III. NEXT STEPS: FURTHER EXAMINATION
For the above-stated reasons, the impact of in-house counsel on corporate 
governance remains both under-examined and undervalued.  Further examination of 
in-house counsel may: (i) illustrate how a well-positioned in-house legal presence, 
complemented by external gatekeepers, is an essential feature of healthy corporate 
governance for large publicly-traded firms; and (ii) yield more pragmatic resolutions 
to corporate governance issues. 
23 See id. at 487; see also Langevoort, supra note 17, at 801-10. 
24 See Duggin, supra note 11, at 1034-35 (explaining how outside counsel may lack sufficient 
knowledge to effectively solve a legal problem for an organization, and how management may give 
outside counsel “selected” facts that will “circumvent unfavorable advice” from inside counsel). 
25 As Ronald Gilson observed, the best potential for private gatekeeping may actually lie with in-house 
counsel.  See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L.
REV. 869, 915 (1990); see also Duggin, supra note 11, at 1036 (noting that, in certain situations, hiring 
“independent counsel” may be done at the expense of the shareholders and the company).
